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This paper proposes the use of consumers’ preferences in formulating policies for keeping secret information
about terrorist activities and threats that might compromise future security. We report the results from
two surveys indicating that people have clear preferences for full disclosure of some terrorist related
information regardless of its consequences for specific industries or future threats. This result is especially
clear for threats involving commercial airlines. For those threats associated with more general surveillance
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1. Introduction 
It is widely assumed that security requires some amount of secrecy. Even in a free 
society, most people recognize the need for governments to keep some information secret to 
protect their citizens. But how much is enough and how do people react when the information 
involved is about terrorist threats? This paper reports the first national survey of people’s 
attitudes toward public deception in the name of security.
1 
Many discussions of the criteria for limiting the disclosure of information in a democracy 
are based on conceptual arguments. They consider the relative importance of accountability and 
policy effectiveness when full information disclosure contributes positively to the first objective 
and may have negative impacts for the second. Secrecy has increased since the September 11, 
2001 attacks in the U.S. because it is argued that public disclosure of the government’s private 
information related to anything that might compromise security will increase terrorist risks. 
Priest and Arkin’s [2010] series in The Washington Post on the privatization of national security 
is a notable example of one of the effects of these policies. Their first installment highlights the 
significant role of private companies in homeland security operations, a situation that has been 
largely unknown to the public. 
                                                           
1 Viscusi and Zeckhauser [2003] conducted a survey of law students’ attitudes toward security screenings and 
other infringements on civil liberties as measures intended to reduce terrorist threats. 3 
 
In another context, Shapiro and Siegel’s [2010] analysis of the arguments for secrecy use 
models of the strategic actions of the government and of terrorists, as interacting agents. They 
recommend a nuanced approach in evaluating policies that call for increased secrecy in the name 
of security. In their analysis information is grouped into broad types- organizational, general, and 
target specific. Their models do not offer unambiguous criteria for disclosure versus secrecy. 
Nonetheless, their analysis does suggest the analysis should consider the type of information that 
is being kept secret and the net benefits of disclosure, weighing the increased risks against the 
potential for an enhanced ability to protect the public due to better use of information
2.  
The analysis we report in this paper is based on a survey of Knowledge Network’s 
panelists in thirty-three large metropolitan areas conducted in late 2009 and early 2010. While 
our survey was developed before we became aware of the Shapiro and Siegel findings, the 
design poses questions that complement the logic of their analytical structure. Shapiro and 
Siegel’s models assume the government agent reflects the preferences of the population at risk. 
These preferences are assumed to depend on reducing the risk of a successful attack. Our survey 
findings suggest the public’s preferences are more complex. The respondents want some types of 
information revealed regardless of the consequences for future risks.  As a result the criteria for 
information disclosure need to consider the preferences of the people facing the increased risk 
that disclosure creates.  
These responses do not appear to be due to cognitive mistakes and vary with the type of 
information that would need to be withheld. Thus, even if the net benefits from enhanced 
                                                           
2  Recent work by Abadie and Dermisi [2008] is based on the maintained assumption that people assess the risks of 
future terrorist actions based on the past. In this study they use commercial office vacancy rates to assess whether 
vacancies are higher  in business locations near “signature” buildings with the potential for greater terrorist 
threats. This type of logic is another reason why we focused our sample on respondents from large metropolitan 
areas. 4 
 
efficiency in the government’s responses to threats with information were small compared to the 
risks, people will prefer full disclosure of certain types of information. Our findings indicate that 
disclosing information about threats to commercial airlines is especially important to the survey 
respondents.  
Section two provides some highlights of the literature on the criteria for withholding 
information in a democracy. Section three describes our survey. Section four summarizes our 
findings and the last discusses their implications.  
 
2. Information and Security Externalities 
  Government secrecy may seem inconsistent with the principles that define a democratic 
society. However, the issues involved in public management of information dissemination in a 
free society are complex. Most scholars considering the subject argue that some limits to full 
information disclosure are essential. Thompson [1999], for example, described the inherent 
dilemma as having two parts: 
“…democracy requires publicity, but some democratic policies require secrecy. The first 
horn [of this dilemma] is familiar enough: The policies and processes of government 
must be public in order to secure the consent of the governed. … the second horn points 
to the fact that some policies and processes, if they were made public, could not be 
carried out as effectively or at all. These policies and processes may well be ones to 
which citizens would consent if they had the opportunity” (p. 182, bracketed term added).  
 
  Homeland security policy since September 11, 2001, has focused renewed attention on the 
question of government secrecy. Thompson’s description applies nicely to debates over when 
information should be kept secret for national security reasons.  5 
 
Shapiro and Siegel [2010] address the question of information disclosure in a more 
formal modeling framework
3. They use models of the strategic interaction between two players 
to analyze the conditions under which information should or should not be kept secret. They use 
a model with two agents. The first represents the government. This agent must decide whether to 
release different types of information. The second represents all the terrorists grouped as a single 
“player” who would use the information to “destroy, incapacitate or exploit critical infrastructure 
across the United States to threaten national security….”
4 The authors consider whether 
information provided by the government will be a net benefit to the society that has the 
information and faces the threat from terrorists. Their analysis reviews three different types of 
information: 
(1) Organizational Information- This is described as information that would help the 
government predict terrorists’ operating patterns. 
(2) General Information- This information need not be associated with terrorism directly. 
It could be associated with accountability of governing units and anticipating shortfalls in 
service. They cite research uncovering capacity limits or key nodes in 
telecommunications infrastructure that serves to identify limitations before they create 
problems. Such anticipatory research could also convey general information about 
weaknesses of the system. 
(3) Target Specific Information- Systems that allow the reporting of vulnerabilities of key 
facilities to threats and can be effective in reducing those limitations.  
                                                           
3 Shapiro and Siegel [2008] is a mathematical appendix to their paper which provides the details for the models 
underlying their conclusions. 
4 Shapiro and Siegel cite Homeland Security Presidential Directive seven as the source of a redefinition following 
September 11, 2001, of the scope of secrecy in the name of national security. See discussion pp 67-68 and note #4. 6 
 
  In all three classes of information, the dissemination of information has both positive and 
negative effects. Sharing organizational and general information allows more people to work on 
the issues and, as a result, increases the chances of improved responses to specific terrorist 
threats or system vulnerabilities. Of course, as several authors have noted,
5 the terrorists are also 
using the freely available information. When the protecting agent and the agent seeking to 
disable interact continuously, the realized risks (and outcomes) are the result of the sequence of 
strategic interactions. Once information is released the interactions change because terrorists can 
react. Given that terrorists will react, the outcomes resulting from the government’s decisions to 
release information, the form in which the information is released, and the government’s 
protective responses become endogenous variables to the model.   
Using the case of organizational information as an example of this endogeneity, consider 
the government’s acknowledgment of a database on terrorist actions and research about terrorists 
based on that data.  Knowing the existence of this information creates incentives for terrorists to 
change tactics, reducing either the value of the database or the incentives to study the data. As 
another example, identifying “weak links” as either general information or target specific 
information offers opportunities to fix them, but also provides ideas to the terrorists of potential 
targets.  
In the end Shapiro and Siegel conclude favoring a more nuanced approach to information 
policy and suggest: 
                                                           
5 Enders and Sandler [2006] offer the most complete overview of the literature and in chapters five and six 
specifically discuss the ways information influence terrorist responses. In chapter six the specific focus on 
transnational terrorism and the failure to share information across the autonomous agencies protecting individual 
countries offers an example of the Shapiro Siegel argument. Zhuang and Bier [2010] offer a brief summary of some 
of the more recent literature on strategic models of government terrorist interactions. 7 
 
“Under a wide range of conditions, open sharing of government’s private information can 
enhance efforts to protect citizens. This is true even when the information deals directly 
with specific targets. When the positive externalities of information sharing are taken into 
account, the set of conditions under which open information sharing benefits society 
become wider still. Our analysis puts to rest the overly simple conception that revealing 
vulnerabilities to the other side is strictly a poor idea.” (p. 96, emphasis added). 
 
  The conclusion follows in part from an assumption that the “publicness” of the 
information allows the government agent to act “faster” and “better” than the terrorist. That is, 
the government has the opportunity to take advantage of insights from many sources through 
coordinated use of what is learned. With more people looking at problems or with greater “light 
on problems” there are more likely to be solutions and/or actions to address them.
6  The 
government “benefits” from public release of information because it can make greater use of the 
information as data and can coordinate responses as a result.  
  This logic is actually not a part of their formal model. Nonetheless, it is consistent with 
their focus on technical features of the interaction. The strategic interaction in their model is 
about factors influencing the ability of the government to “produce” protection. People’s 
preferences may be more multi-faceted with different concerns about disclosure about specific 
types of information. One reason stems from differences in the ability to self-protect across 
different people. Another arises with heterogeneity in the assessment of different types of 
theorist risks. These extensions are important if the general public does display marked 
differences in their attitudes toward disclosing different types of information and provide the 
motivation for our survey. 
 
                                                           
6 This assessment is based on the explanations described in the Shapiro-Siegel [2010] paper not their mathematical 
appendix to the paper. The appendix (Shapiro and Siegel [2008])  is a more narrowly focused set of two person 
game-theoretic models developed in expected utility terms where the odds of specific actions being effective 
depend on the other agent’s behavior including information disclosure. 8 
 
3. A Survey on the Merits of Secrecy 
  This section describes a survey to assess the public’s tolerance for government secrecy 
under different conditions.  The survey was structured as part of a larger study on the benefits of 
homeland security policies.  As part of the questionnaire, each respondent was asked whether 
they would support allowing the government to keep information secret given a set of conditions.  
Figure 1 contains the wording of the three questions with scenarios presenting different types of 
information and consequences. Each scenario must have some elements of specific types of 
events to establish the context. As a result, a designation of each one as an example of the 
Shapiro-Siegel categories will be imperfect.  We regard version B as similar to what Shapiro and 
Siegel label as target specific information.  Version A, an airport surveillance system, is closer to 
the organizational information category. Version C has elements of both but a generic 
surveillance system is highlighted specifically in this scenario as well. Each information scenario 
also includes a statement about the likelihood that announcing details of the information 
collected as part of reducing the threat of some terrorist action could reduce the ability to protect 
against future threats of that type. Each respondent was randomly assigned one of three 
scenarios. Each person also received one of three probabilities (1 in 5 chances, 1 in 10 chances 
and 1 in 100 chances) that the negative externality due to the information disclosure would 
occur. The respondents were asked whether they would favor announcing the information or 
keeping the details secret.  
  Our survey was implemented in two phases using a web-based instrument to members of 
the Knowledge Networks panel.
7  Unlike most other internet panels, Knowledge Networks 
                                                           
7 The survey instrument was developed and tested in four focus groups and through a pre-test involving 222 
panelists, 18 years and older, who lived in the metropolitan areas of Kansas City and Los Angeles. The pre-test 9 
 
recruits a representative sample of households onto their panel through Random-Digit Dialing 
and, more recently, through address-based sampling.  Households that do not have a computer 
are provided with a computer and internet access. Households with a computer are provided with 
free internet access.  
The survey was first sent to a sample of panelists aged 18 and over who lived in one of 
33 metropolitan areas between December 15, 2009, and December 31, 2009.
8 Seventy-one 
percent of those invited responded to yield a sample with 1901 panelists
9. Major metropolitan 
areas were selected for the sample, based in part on the discussions during survey pretests 
indicating that most people felt terrorist threats were most salient for those living or working in 
large metropolitan areas.  
  A follow-up survey of 482 different panelists in four of the metropolitan areas involved 
in the first sample was conducted between April 1, 2010 and April 19, 2010. The same survey 
instrument was used for both surveys. This second survey allowed assessment of whether the 
events surrounding the Christmas bomber influenced the panelists’ attitudes toward secrecy.
10  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indicated respondents were able to answer the questions and understood the materials presented. The questionnaire 
was shortened to accommodate budget restraints. 
 
8 The thirty-three metropolitan areas were: Atlanta, GA; Boston, MA; Buffalo, NY; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; 
Columbia, MO; Dallas, TX; Detroit, MI; Greenville, SC; Houston, TX; Huntsville, AL; Kansas City, KS; Las Vegas, NV;  
Lincoln, NE; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; Mobile, AL; Nashville, TN; New Orleans, LA; New York City, NY; Norfolk, VA;  
Oklahoma City, OK; Phoenix, AZ; Pittsburgh, PA; Raleigh, NC; Richmond, VA; San Diego, CA; San Francisco, CA; 
Seattle, WA; St. Louis, MO; Tallahassee, FL; Tampa, FL; Washington, D.C. 
9 The overall response rate for Knowledge Networks surveys is below 10% if one accounts for the entire panel 
recruiting process, which includes many steps at which panel members could drop out. Smith et al [2009] discuss 
in the appendix to their paper the recruiting process for the Knowledge Network panels and the analysis of 
selection effects associated with this process. The research record to date suggests that while the Knowledge 
Network panel is systematically different from the U.S. population as a whole due to non-response, this process 
has not impacted the assessment of risks, characterization of individual preferences for policies that affect non-
market environmental services or security risks.  
10 On December 25, 2009, an attempt to destroy a Northwest passenger jet bound for Detroit was unsuccessful. 
The event received extensive news coverage in the months after it took place. Two hundred and thirty of our 
panelists in the first sample completed their interviews after the event. We investigated whether their responses 10 
 
  Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the respondents to the two 
surveys. The first column reports summary attributes and attitudes of the full December 2009 
sample. Four metropolitan areas, Chicago, the District of Columbia, Los Angeles, and New 
York, were oversampled in this survey. These areas were the focus of the second survey in April 
2010. The second column provides a summary of characteristics for these four areas’ panelists in 
the December 2009 survey and the third column reports the same summary statistics for the 
independent panelists from these areas who participated in the April survey. As these summary 
results suggest, the panelists are broadly similar in their demographic characteristics, education, 
income, and attitudes toward personal responsibility for being prepared for a variety of 
uncontrollable threats. Considering the summary statistics in Table 1, most of the sample are 
between 35 and 64 (over 75 years of age is the omitted category in the table). The majority are 
white and married. Slightly greater than half of the respondents have a college degree or higher 
and household income levels are higher than the U.S. average. The majority felt it was very or 
somewhat important to be prepared for disasters. 
       
4. Results 
  The first row in Table 1 reports the proportion of respondents in each sample who 
favored full government disclosure of information (publicizing the truth) when we combine the 
responses from all three of the scenarios.  The results suggest that somewhat less than half the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
were different from those completing the survey before December 26
th. There was no difference in their 
responses. This was tested using simple chi-square tests as well as in the more extensive multivariate model. As a 
result we focus our attention on the analysis of the second survey with added time to consider all of the news and 
discussion of terrorism threats. 11 
 
respondents would favor information disclosure. This result holds for higher risk metro areas as 
sub-samples as well as over time in these four higher risk metropolitan areas.  
However, this general result is misleading. As Table 2 suggests, there are dramatic 
differences in this willingness to accept secrecy across different types of threats. The three panels 
in Table 2 provide the most direct summary of our primary findings. Adult residents of major 
metropolitan areas likely to be potential terrorist targets do not accept blanket secrecy policies 
for different types of information. There is a sharp and persistent difference in their attitudes 
toward public secrecy that depends on the nature of the information describing the terrorist 
target. 
  Policies that would withhold information about terrorist plots involving commercial 
airlines would not be acceptable to over eighty percent of the respondents asked about them. The 
rate observed for respondents from Chicago, the District of Columbia, Los Angeles, and New 
York did not change after the Christmas day attempted bombing of a commercial flight bound 
for Detroit. Information associated with incidents involving surveillance systems that disrupted 
terrorists at airports or with the financial system could be withheld from the perspective of the 
majority of respondents receiving them. The percentage willing to withhold this information was 
over seventy-five percent and stable across sub-samples and time periods. 
  Changes in the likelihood of information impacting future safety did increase the 
acceptability of secrecy for incidents involving the commercial airline system. Nonetheless, this 
effect was small and respondents did not discriminate between odds of one in five compared to 
one in ten. The primary finding from varying the stated likelihood of future effects was an 
increased propensity for full disclosure at the lowest odds of disruption from making the 
information public, when compared to either of two higher odds cases. This result implies that 12 
 
people did understand the external effect of information disclosure. Higher risk of effects 
reduced the demands for disclosure but the effect was not large enough to change general 
sentiment for full disclosure in the case of threats to commercial airlines.  
  These findings are quite robust and make no assumptions about perceptions of the 
importance of the secrecy or the reasons why availability of information might be important to 
Knowledge Network panelists.  They assume each respondent receiving one of the nine 
treatments can be treated as approximately equivalent to any other. Table 4 investigates whether 
observable features of panelists’ heterogeneity influences our findings. This assessment fits 
probit models to panelist responses to the information disclosure questions. The model 
hypothesizes that a response favoring full disclosure is a function of the type of information- 
organizational (Versions A and, potentially, C), target specific associated with the commercial 
airline system (Version B). We also include fixed effects for two of the three odds of disruption 
(so the parameters measure the effect compared to the omitted category). Our probit model is 
restricted to exclude an intercept. This normalization allows us to identify separate estimates for 
the effect of each version rather than to estimate a comparative effect (i.e. relating the included 
terms to the omitted category). Our conclusions would not change with an alternative 
normalization. 
  The models include age class fixed effects, gender, a variable identifying whether the 
respondent’s household had young children, race, education fixed effects, marital status, 
household income and a count of the number of emergency preparedness actions they have 
taken.
11 This last variable is intended to serve as an indicator of their concerns about hazards and 
                                                           
11 The question asked respondents about a list of things people have done to prepare for disasters including: have 
a first aid kit, have a weeks supply of personal care and hygiene products, have a 7-day supply of prescriptions, 13 
 
propensity to self protect. Finally we estimated the basic model using the full sample with and 
without fixed effects for the thirty-three metropolitan areas. 
  The findings confirm the results from our simpler cross tabulations. After controlling for 
age, gender, race, income, and the likelihood of disruption, these respondents consistently 
support disclosure of information concerning terrorist threats to the airline system, regardless of 
consequences described as leading to damage and potential destruction of a viable commercial 
airline sector. By contrast, they would support withholding information that was general about 
surveillance methods. In addition information could be withheld about a surveillance system that 
reduces the threat of disruption to the credit system. 
  We considered the model using the full sample (both December 2009 and April 2010 
surveys) and found the airline related threat between the surveys associated with the incident 
labeled the Christmas bomber, did not influence attitudes toward disclosing airline information. 
The interaction variable defined as the product of the fixed effect for Version B and one 
indicating that the respondent was part of the second survey was not significant. Controlling for 
metropolitan areas did not influence our conclusions (see column (2)). Similarly restricting the 
sample to the four metro areas before (column (3)) or after the Christmas bombing threat 
(column (4)) did not alter the general findings. 
  Our ability to isolate the effects of demographic variables was influenced by sample size. 
It appears women are more willing to support withholding information. Those with at least a 
college degree are not. Married households are more willing to allow limits on information 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
have a radio with fresh batteries, designate a contact outside the area, and have a two week supply of food and 
water. This variable is a count of the number each respondent indicated they had available.  14 
 
disclosure. Otherwise, support for treating the disclosure of different types of terrorist related 
information differently is quite uniform. 
  Thus, these results imply that the Shapiro-Siegel “nuanced policy” should consider 
people’s views about the type of information they indicate should be disclosed and not assume 
strategic models of government and terrorist interactions in response to information can be 
interpreted independent of context for the information. People display significantly different 
preferences for full disclosure of terrorist related information.  
 
5. Implications 
  There are certainly limits to full information disclosure in free democratic societies. 
Many observers have argued the 9/11 attacks lead to significant increases in calls for secrecy as 
essential to homeland security. Political scientists have considered the properties of alternative 
decision criteria that can be applied in making the choices about when Democratic governments 
can reasonably withhold information from citizens. Based on formal models of the strategic 
interaction between two agents, the government and a terrorist entity, along with informal 
contextual analysis, Shapiro and Siegel argue against increased secrecy in favor of a more 
nuanced policy. They suggest, given the assumptions of their analysis, that open access to most 
types of information is likely to yield greater benefits to a threatened society like the U.S. than 
most forms of secrecy. 
  Our analysis suggests their discussion and most of the earlier work on limits to 
information disclosure leave out the preferences of the citizens who would be affected by these 
choices. That is, the strategic analyses take as given that the government “agent” in these models 15 
 
can be adequately described by assuming the primary concern is avoiding a successful attack of 
any type. 
  We began our analysis with the premise that people have different demands for 
information about different types of threats. As a result, even if the government is assumed to be 
equally effective in responding to all types of threats and that information disclosure would be 
equally damaging, regardless of the type involved, people might nonetheless want to have 
information in some situations regardless of the consequences. Our survey results support this 
hypothesis. Respondents were especially concerned about full disclosure when the events 
involved threats to the commercial airline system. Comparable descriptions of threats to the 
effectiveness of a terrorist surveillance system or to compromising the credit system yielded 
much greater willingness to accept secrecy. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Dec 2009  April 2010 
  
Full Sample  Four Metro Areas  Four Metro 
Areas 
Proportion Who Favored 
Full Information 
Disclosure  0.428  0.433  0.419 
Age (fixed effects)          
18-24  0.020  0.028  0.025 
25-34  0.086  0.092  0.091 
35-44  0.143  0.146  0.172 
45-54  0.241  0.256  0.2670 
55-64  0.270  0.256  0.243 
65-74  0.176  0.163  0.149 
Female  0.586  0.570  0.629 
Young Children  0.092  0.090  0.108 
No. of Children  0.472  0.482  0.531 
White  0.772  0.717  0.703 
No-High School  0.020  0.026  0.014 
College  0.518  0.548  0.612 
Married  0.576  0.536  0.517 
Income  82,174  93,659  97,037 
Importance of Being 
Prepared for Disasters          
Very Important  0.51  0.53  0.54 
Somewhat Important  0.43  0.40  0.40 
Not too Important  0.05  0.06  0.05 



















Table 2: Cross-Tabulations- Version and Sample 
 
December, 2009 Sample 
                 
     Version    
     A  B  C    
  
Disclose Information 
145  511  157    
   0.23  0.83  0.24    
                 
  
Withhold Information 
486  107  495    
   0.77  0.17  0.76    
           χ
2=596.3 
           (p-value=0.00) 
                 
December, 2009 Sample for Chicago, DC, Los Angeles, New York 
             
     Version    
     A  B  C    
  
Disclose Information 
48  180  54    
   0.22  0.81  0.25    
                 
  
Withhold Information 
167  41  161    
   0.78  0.19  0.75    
           χ
2=198.5 
           (p-value=0.00) 
                 
April, 2010 Sample for Chicago, DC, Los Angeles, New York 
             
     Version    
     A  B  C    
  
Disclose Information 
43  119  40    
   0.26  0.82  0.24    
              
  
Withhold Information 
125  27  128    
   0.74  0.18  0.76    
           χ
2=135.0 
           (p-value=0.00) 








Full Sample  Dec 2009  April 2010 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
A-Organizational 
Information 
-0.85  -0.78  -0.77  -0.70 
(-4.07)  (-4.33)  (-2.02)  (-1.67) 
B-Commercial Airlines  
0.88  0.93  0.94  1.01 
(4.15)  (5.05)  (2.46)  (2.32) 
C-Credit System  -0.80  -0.74  -0.66  -0.74 
(-3.87)  (-4.12)  (-1.76)  (-1.69) 
Air * April Survey  -0.05  -0.04  -  - 
(-0.33)  (-0.28)  -  - 
P-disrupt= 1/5  0.06  0.07  0.19  0.04 
(0.87)  (0.98)  (1.38)  (0.25) 
P-disrupt= 1/100  0.19  0.19  0.28  0.14 
(2.69)  (2.61)  (2.07)  (0.84) 
Age 18-24 
0.49  0.47  0.64  -0.46 
(1.88)  (1.80)  (1.39)  (-0.75) 
Age 25-34 
0.26  0.22  -0.10  0.12 
(1.55)  (1.38)  (-.032)  (0.32) 
Age 35-44  0.38  0.36  0.38  0.28 
(2.54)  (2.44)  (1.30)  (0.87) 
Age 45-54  0.23  0.20  -0.10  0.07 
(1.63)  (1.50)  (-0.40)  (0.21) 
Age 55-64 
0.17  0.15  0.15  -0.07 
(1.24)  (1.17)  (0.59)  (-0.23) 
Age 65-74  0.19  0.18  0.08  0.13 
(1.31)  (1.34)  (0.28)  (0.38) 
Female 
-0.20  -0.20  -0.26  -0.18 
(-3.29)  (-3.34)  (-2.23)  (-1.29) 
Young Children 
-0.14  -0.16  -0.26  -0.48 
(-1.34)  (-1.50)  (-1.19)  (-2.05) 
White  0.04  0.03  -0.17  0.03 
(0.47)  (0.30)  (-0.97)  (0.15) 
African American  -0.13  -0.16  -0.29  -0.28 
(-1.06)  (-1.33)  (-1.26)  (-1.17) 
No-High School  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.30 
(-0.23)  (-0.17)  (-0.02)  (-0.43) 
At Least College  0.19  0.18  0.25  0.24 
(3.13)  (2.99)  (2.07)  (1.61) 
Married 
-0.12  -0.13  -0.04  -0.20 
(-1.87)  (-1.95)  (-0.31)  (-1.26) 







(-1.43)  (-1.54)  (-0.54)  (-0.43) 
Count-Emergency 
Preparations 
-0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01 
(-1.24)  (-1.28)  (-0.75)  (-0.27) 
Metro-Fixed Effect  yes  no  yes  yes 
No of Observations  2,383  2,383  651  482 
χ
2  775.44  758.17  212.85  153.23 
                                                           
a The numbers in parentheses below each coefficient are Z statistics for the null hypothesis of no association based 
on robust, asymptotic standard errors, estimated using Stata 11's probit estimation routine. 20 
 
Figure 1: Information Scenarios and Question-Wording  
 
Background 
                               
Now we would like to ask you about a different situation. National security has always required that some information be kept secret, often for a long time. Usually the 
government keeps information secret because making the information public might be dangerous for the people who supplied the information to the government 
officials, the people involved in the activity being kept secret, or it might hurt the government’s ability to protect the public from threats in the future. 
 
At the same time, there is increasing recognition among psychologists that many people overreact to some risks.   As a result some experts support changes to policies 
that determine what information to keep secret.  Please consider each of the following situations and indicate whether you would support letting a government expert 
decide whether to keep the information secret in order to protect our security or our economy. 
 
Version A: Organizational Information 
                         
Suppose Federal law enforcement has prevented a major plot to destroy airports in Los Angeles and New York.  The investigators are confident all terrorists are 
captured.  
If the Federal government announces the details of the arrests then the public would know how effective our surveillance system is and would have more confidence in 
the government.  
However, if they announce the details of the arrests, then it might give away the techniques they used to identify the suspects and other details of the security network.  
This could potentially make it harder for Federal law enforcement to uncover future plots.  When the suspects come to trial, the information can be protected under 
federal laws that limit public access to information associated with cases where there are threats to national security.  
 
Assume that there is a 1 in (5, 10, 100) chance that announcing details about the arrests would make it harder to uncover other plots in the future.  Would you favor 
announcing the details of the arrests or keeping the details secret from the public? 
 
      I would support announcing the details from the arrests 
      I would not support announcing the details; I would support keeping the details secret 
 
Version B: Target Specific Information-
Commercial Airlines 
                         
A terrorist attack on a commercial flight could lead to an irrational fear of air travel.  If people are afraid to fly, this would impact the commercial airline business and 
potentially undermine the financial viability of major airline companies.   
Some experts have recommended it would be in everyone’s best interest to keep information about the cause of an airplane crash due to a terrorist attack secret from the 
public.  This would avoid the possibility of an irrational fear of flying by the public that could have large economic effects.  
The actual risk of being in a plane that was the target of a terrorist attack is extremely small.  If there was a terrorist attack on a plane, the cause of the crash would be 
kept a secret from the public – the public would be told the crash was caused by something else.  The experts believe that keeping the information about the terrorist 
attack secret would save the economy and the airline industry from a loss of business.  Experts believe this would be in the public’s best interest and it defeats the 
terrorist’s intentions by protecting the economy. 
Assume that there is a 1 in (5, 10, 100) chance that if the government announced a terrorist attack caused a plane to crash it would cause complete disruption of the 
commercial airline industry that would take 5 years to recover from.  Would you favor announcing that a terrorist attack caused a plane to crash or keeping the 
information secret from the public? 
 
      I would support announcing that a terrorist attack caused a plane crash 
      I would not support announcing that a terrorist attack caused a plane crash. I would support keeping the information secret from the public 
 
Version C: Target Specific Information- 
Credit System 
                         
Suppose Federal law enforcement has prevented a major terrorist plot to disrupt internet service at commercial banks that would prevent processing of credit and debit 
card sales for 48 hours – so no one in the U.S. would be able to use a credit or debit card for 48 hours. The investigators are confident all terrorists are captured.  
 
If the Federal government announces the details of the arrests then the public would know how effective our surveillance system is and have more confidence in the 
government.   
 
However, if they announce the details of the arrests, then it might give away the techniques they used to identify the suspects and other details of the security network.  
This could potentially make it harder for Federal law enforcement to uncover future plots. When the suspects come to trial, the information can be protected under 
federal laws that limit public access to information associated with cases where there are threats to national security. 
 
Assume that there is a 1 in (5, 10, 100) chance that announcing details about the arrests would make it harder to uncover other plots in the future. Would you favor 
announcing the details of the arrests or keeping the details secret from the public? 
 
      I would support announcing the details from the arrests 
      I would not support announcing the details; I would support keeping the details secret 21 
 
 